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Abstract. We show that the Owen value for TU games with coalition
structure can be characterized without additivity axiom similarly as it
was done by Young for the Shapley value for general TU games. Our ax-
iomatization via four axioms of efficiency, marginality, symmetry across
coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions is obtained from the original
Owen’s one by replacement of the additivity and null-player axioms via
marginality. We show that the alike axiomatization for the generalization
of the Owen value suggested by Winter for games with level structure is
valid as well.
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1 Introduction
We consider the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure that can be
regarded as an expansion of the Shapley value for the situation when a coalition
structure is involved. The Owen value was introduced in [2] via a set of axioms it
determining. These axioms were vastly inspired by original Shapley’s axiomati-
zation that in turn exploits the additivity axiom. However, the additivity axiom
that being a very beautiful mathematical statement does not express any fair-
ness property. Another axiomatization of the Shapley value proposed by Young
[5] via marginality, efficiency, and symmetry appears to be more attractive since
all the axioms present different reasonable properties of fair division. The goal
of this paper is to evolve the Young’s approach to the case of the Owen value for
games with coalition structure. We provide a new axiomatization for the Owen
value without additivity axiom that is obtained from the original Owen’s one by
the replacement of additivity and null-player via marginality. We show that the
similar axiomatization can be also obtained for the generalization of the Owen
value suggested by Winter in [4] for games with level structure.
? The research was supported by NWO (The Netherlands Organization for Scientific
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Sect. 2 introduces basic definitions and notation. In Sect. 3, we present an
axiomatization for the Owen value for games with coalition structure and for the
Winter’s generalization for games with level structure on the basis of marginality
axiom.
2 Definitions and notation
First recall some definitions and notation. A cooperative game with transferable
utility (TU game) is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of n ≥ 2
players and v : 2N → IR is a characteristic function, defined on the power set of
N , satisfying v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N (or S ∈ 2N ) of s players is called a
coalition, and the associated real number v(S) presents the worth of the coalition
S. For simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears, we write v instead of
〈N, v〉 when refer to a game, and also omit the braces when writing one-player
coalitions such as {i}. The set of all games with a fixed player set N we denote
GN . For any set of games G ⊆ GN , a value on G is a mapping ψ : G → IRn that
associates with each game v ∈ G a vector ψ(v) ∈ IRn, where the real number
ψi(v) represents the payoff to the player i in the game v.
We consider games with coalition structure. A coalition structure
B = {B1, ..., Bm} on a player set N is a partition of the player set N , i.e.,
B1 ∪ ... ∪ Bm = N and Bi ∩ Bj = ∅ for i 6= j. Denote by BN a set of all
coalition structures on N . In this context a value is an operator that assigns a
vector of payoffs to any pair (v,B) of a game and a coalitional structure on N .
More precisely, for any set of games G ⊆ GN and any set of coalition structures
B ⊆ BN , a coalitional value on G with a coalition structure from B is a mapping
ξ : G × B → IRn that associates with each pair 〈v,B〉 of a game v ∈ G and a
coalition structure B ∈ B a vector ξ(v,B) ∈ IRn, where the real number ξi(v,B)
represents the payoff to the player i in the game v with the coalition structure
B.
We say players i, j ∈ N are symmetric with respect to the game v ∈ G if they
make the same marginal contribution to any coalition, i.e., for any S ⊆ N\{i, j},
v(S ∪ i) = v(S ∪ j). A player i is a null-player in the game v ∈ G if he adds
nothing to any coalition non-containing him, i.e., v(S ∪ i) = v(S), for every
S ⊆ N\i.
In what follows we denote the cardinality of any set A by |A|.
A coalitional value ξ is efficient if, for all v ∈ G and all B ∈ B,∑
i∈N
ξi(v,B) = v(N).
A coalitional value ξ is marginalist if, for all v ∈ G and all B ∈ B, for every
i ∈ N , ξi(v,B) depends only upon the ith marginal utility vector {v(S ∪ i) −
v(S)}S⊆N\i, i.e.,
ξi(v,B) = φi({v(S ∪ i)− v(S)}S⊆N\i),
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where φi : IR2
n−1 → IR1.
A coalitional value ξ possesses the null-player property if, for all v ∈ G and
all B ∈ B, every null-player i in game v gets nothing, i.e., ξi(v,B) = 0.
A coalitional value ξ is additive if, for any two v, w ∈ G and all B ∈ B,
ξi(v + w,B) = ξi(v,B) + ξi(w,B),
where (v + w)(S) = v(S) + w(S), for all S ⊆ N .
We consider two symmetry axioms. First note that for a given game v ∈ G
and coalition structure B = {B1, ..., Bm} ∈ B, we can define a game between
coalitions or in other terms a quotient game 〈M,vB〉 with M = {1, . . . ,m} in
which each coalition Bi acts as a player. We define the quotient game vB as:
vB(Q) = v(
⋃
i∈Q
Bi), for all Q ⊆M.
A coalitional value ξ is symmetric across coalitions if, for all v ∈ G and all
B ∈ B, for any two symmetric in vB players i, j ∈ M , the total payoffs for
coalitions Bi, Bj are equal, i.e.,∑
k∈Bi
ξk(v,B) =
∑
k∈Bj
ξk(v,B).
A coalitional value ξ is symmetric within coalitions if, for all v ∈ G and all
B ∈ B, any two players who are symmetric in v and belong to the same coalition
in B get the same payoffs, i.e., for any i, j ∈ Bk ∈ B that are symmetric in v,
ξi(v,B) = ξj(v,B).
The Owen value was introduced in Owen [2] as the unique efficient, additive,
symmetric across coalitions, and symmetric within coalitions coalitional value
that possesses the null-player property.1 In the sequel the Owen value in a game
v with a coalition structure B we denote Ow(v,B). For any v ∈ GN and any
B ∈ BN , for all i ∈ N , Owi(v,B) can be given by the following formula
Owi(v,B) =
∑
Q⊆M
Q 63k
∑
S⊆Bk
S 63i
q! (m− q − 1)! s! (bk − s− 1)!
m! bk!
· (1)
(v(
⋃
j∈Q
Bj ∪ S ∪ i)− v(
⋃
j∈Q
Bj ∪ S)),
where k is such that i ∈ Bk ∈ B.
1 We present above the original Owen’s axioms in the formulation of Winter [4].
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3 Axiomatization of the Owen value via marginality
We prove below that the Owen value defined on entire set of games GN with any
possible coalition structure from BN can be characterized by four axioms of effi-
ciency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and symmetry within coalitions.
Our proof strategy by induction is similar to that in Young [5].
Theorem 3.1. The only efficient, marginalist, symmetric across coalitions, and
symmetric within coalitions coalitional value defined on GN ×BN is the Owen
value.
Proof. One can easily check that the Owen value possesses these four properties.
We prove below the converse. Let ξ be an efficient, marginalist, symmetric
across coalitions, and symmetric within coalitions coalitional value defined on
GN ×BN , and let B ∈ BN . Any game v ∈ GN can be presented via unanimity
basis {uT }T⊆N
T 6=∅
[3],
v =
∑
T⊆N
T 6=∅
λT uT , (2)
where
uT (S) =
{
1, T ⊆ S,
0, T 6⊆ S, for all S ⊆ N.
The Owen value in the unanimity game uT with a coalition structure B for any
i ∈ N is equal
Owi(uT ,B) =

1
|B(i) ∩ T |mT , i ∈ T,
0, i /∈ T,
where B(i) is such element of the coalition structure B that contains player i and
mT is equal to the number of coalitions in B that have a nonempty intersection
with T , i.e., B(i) = Bk ∈ B : Bk 3 i, and mT = |{k ∈M : Bk∩T 6= ∅}|. Because
of its additivity property the Owen value in any game v with a coalition structure
B can be equivalently expressed as
Owi(v,B) =
∑
∅6=T⊆N : T3i
λT
|B(i) ∩ T |mT .
Let now the index I of a game v ∈ GN be the minimum number of terms
under summation in (2), i.e.,
v =
I∑
k=1
λTk uTk ,
where all λTk 6= 0. We proceed the remaining part of the proof by induction on
this index I.
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If I = 0, then v is identically zero on all coalitions. All players in both
games v and vB are symmetric. Therefore, by symmetry across coalitions for all
j, k ∈M , ∑
i∈Bj
ξi(v,B) =
∑
i∈Bk
ξi(v,B).
But ∑
j∈M
∑
i∈Bj
ξi(v,B) =
∑
i∈N
ξi(v,B),
and by efficiency ∑
i∈N
ξi(v,B) = 0.
Thus, for all j, k ∈M , ∑
i∈Bj
ξi(v,B) =
∑
i∈Bk
ξi(v,B) = 0.
Whence by symmetry within coalitions it follows that for all i ∈ N ,
ξi(v,B) = 0,
i.e., ξi(v,B) coincides with the Owen value if index I is equal to 0.
Assume now that ξ(v,B) is the Owen value whenever the index of v ∈ GN
is at most I, and consider some v ∈ GN with the index equal to I + 1. Let
T = ∩I+1k=1Tk and i /∈ T . Consider the game
v(i) =
∑
k : Tk3i
λTk uTk
Obviously, the index of v(i) is at most I and, therefore, by induction hypothesis,
ξ(v(i),B) = Ow(v(i),B). For both coalitional values ξ and the Owen value, ith
marginal utility vectors relevant to the games v and v(i) coincide and, so, by
marginalism of both values, ξi(v,B) = ξi(v(i),B) and Owi(v,B) = Owi(v(i),B).
Thus,
ξi(v,B) = Owi(v,B), for all i /∈ T. (3)
If T 6= ∅ then to complete the proof it is enough to show that the last equality
is true for all i ∈ T as well. Consider T with relevance to a coalition structure
B and denote
MT = {j ∈M |Bj ∩ T 6= ∅, Bj ∈ B}.
Notice that if T 6= ∅ then MT 6= ∅ and all players j, k ∈ MT are symmetric in
the game vB. By symmetry among coalitions for both values ξ and the Owen
value, for all j, k ∈MT , ∑
i∈Bj
ξi(v,B) =
∑
i∈Bk
ξi(v,B),
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and ∑
i∈Bj
Owi(v,B) =
∑
i∈Bk
Owi(v,B).
Therefore, because of efficiency of both values and equality (3) it follows that
for all j ∈MT , ∑
i∈Bj∩T
ξi(v,B) =
∑
i∈Bj∩T
Owi(v,B).
All players i ∈ T are symmetric in the game v. Hence, by symmetry within
coalitions, for all j ∈MT and for all i, k ∈ Bj ∩ T ,
ξi(v,B) = ξk(v,B),
and
Owi(v,B) = Owk(v,B).
Whence it follows that for all i ∈ T ,
ξi(v,B) = Owi(v,B). uunionsq
Remark 3.2. Notice that similar as in Young for the Shapley value every effi-
cient, marginalist, symmetric across coalitions, and symmetric within coalitions
coalitional value defined on GN × BN possesses the null-player property. In-
deed, from the proof of the case I = 0 it follows that in the null-game which
is identically zero on all coalitions every efficient, symmetric across coalitions,
and symmetric within coalitions coalitional value ξ gives all players nothing.
But in the null-game all marginal utility vectors are null-vectors. Therefore by
marginality, for any game v ∈ GN and for every null-player i ∈ N in v, that is
the same as for all S ⊆ N\i, v(S ∪ i)− v(S) = 0, follows that ξi(v,B) = 0, i.e.,
the value ξ possesses the null-player property.
Remark 3.3. It is reasonable to note that for some subclasses of games G ⊂ GN ,
for example for the subclass GsaN of superadditive games or for the subclass GcN
of constant-sum games, if it is desired to stay entirely within one of these sub-
classes and not in the entire set of games GN , the same axiomatization for the
Owen value via efficiency, marginality, symmetry across coalitions, and symme-
try within coalitions is still valid. It can be proved similarly to the case of the
Shapley value (see [5], [1]) adapting the ideas applied in the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Winter [4] introduced a generalization of the Owen value for games with level
structure. A level structure is a finite sequence of partitions L = (B1, ...,Bp) such
that every Bi is a refinement of Bi+1. Denote by LN the set of all level structures
on N . In this context, for any set of games G ⊆ GN and any set of level structures
L ⊆ LN , a level structure value on G with a level structure from L is an operator
defined on G × L that assigns a vector of payoffs to any pair (v,L) of a game
v ∈ G and a level structure L ∈ L. It is not difficult to see that the Winter’s
extension of the Owen value for games with level structure admits the similar
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axiomatization with the replacement of two above mentioned symmetry axioms
by the following two captured from [4].
A level structure value ξ is coalitionally symmetric if, for all v ∈ G and any
level structure L = (B1, ...,Bp), for each level 1 ≤ k ≤ p for any two symmetric in
vBk players i, j ∈Mk such that Bi, Bj ∈ Bk are subsets of the same component
in Bt for all t > k, the total payoffs for coalitions Bi, Bj are equal, i.e.,∑
r∈Bi
ξr(v,L) =
∑
r∈Bj
ξr(v,L).
A level structure value ξ is symmetric within coalitions if, for all v ∈ G
and any level structure L = (B1, ...,Bp), any two players i, j who are symmetric
in v and for every level 1 ≤ k ≤ p simultaneously belong or not to the same
non-singleton coalition in Bk, get the same payoffs, i.e., ξi(v,L) = ξj(v,L).
Theorem 3.4. The only efficient, marginalist, coalitionally symmetric, and sym-
metric within coalitions level structure value defined on GN × LN is the Winter
value for games with level structure.
The proof of Theorem 3.4 is a straightforward generalization for the proof of
Theorem 3.1 and we leave it to the reader.
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